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Abstract
Using a new Colombian data set (1830-2000), we analyze how changes
in the electoral legislation with regard to the characteristics of voters
(in terms of education and income levels) has a¤ected scal policy in
electoral times. In line with economic theory, we show that after the
law was reformed in 1936 the composition of the expenditure shifted to-
wards social spending (like education, health, and welfare benets) but
there was decreased spending on infrastructure and investment projects
(like roads). Consistent with the literature, we also nd: 1.The tim-
ing and the size of the political budget cycles changed after 1936 and
2.After 1936 there was a shift in the funding mechanisms from indirect
tax revenues to more debt.
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1 Introduction
An important question in political economy is how, if at all, policy
instruments a¤ect voting behaviour. Although there is a large liter-
ature that has studied evidence of politically-driven manipulations of
economic policy in electoral periods, most studies have focused atten-
tion on developed economies or on the type of government or form of
democracy in place. The strongest evidence of opportunistic cycles in
economic policy has been found in what is called "weak democracies"
which are mainly developing economies in Latin America and Africa.
Evidence has shown that political budget cycles are persistent in
developing countries and in particular in nascent democracies that are
vulnerable, have weaker institutions, impose fewer restrictions on gov-
ernment actions and usually do not have independent central banks
(Brender and Drazen, 2005). However, in recent decades these democ-
racies have become more inclusive, which has augmented popular pres-
sures on political leaders (Remmer, 2003).
The size and the composition (taxes vs. spending) of the electoral
policy cycle also depend on the political and institutional features of
the country. In particular, Latin America has been characterized as
having unsophisticated voters and simple economies, creating greater
incentives and opportunities for politicians to manipulate scal vari-
ables in order to increase the probability that they will stay in power.
Within Latin America, Colombia has been a country of electoral
traditions, strongly rooted in the 19th century and reinforced by in-
tense election campaigns and by a commitment to su¤rage that grew
to involve substantial sectors of Colombia society during the 20th cen-
tury (Posada Carbo, 1997). Without denying the problems of the
electoral system, historians such as David Bushnell (1993) and Mal-
com Deas (1993) have emphasized the early expansion of Colombian
su¤rage, the relatively high levels of voter participation in certain pe-
riods, the intensity of the competition, and the long-term impact of
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frequent electioneering.
These electoral traditions and political contests make Colombia an
interesting case for study. In particular, the constitutional reform es-
tablished in 1936 by the liberal President Alfonso Lopez Pumarejo can
be viewed as a natural experiment in politics.1
Since independence and before this reform, the law stated that only
literate men with properties or a certain amount of income per year
could vote.2These laws had reduced the number of potential voting
block to a limited group of rich and educated men with access to gov-
ernment information and as a result, electioneering was concentrated
on just a small group of homogeneous voters. Following the consti-
tutional reform in 1936, the group of potential voters changed. The
legislative act established that, starting from the next elections (1938),
all men older than 21 years of age could vote irrespective of their in-
come or education. This reform transformed the group of voters from
a small group of high income, literate, and informed men to a large and
heterogeneous group with a majority being low-income and illiterate
uninformed men.
This paper studies this constitutional reform, which changed the
characteristics of the voters, by reference to the theory of Political
Budget Cycles. In particular, it is based our paper on the theoret-
ical approach proposed by Rogo¤ and Sibert (1988), Rogo¤ (1990),
and Drazen and Eslava (2010). The former papers introduced the
signalling role of a pre-election scal expansion under asymmetric in-
formation and unobserved competence.3 In these models, incumbents
want to appear competent in the eyes of voters during electioneering
because more competent politicians can generate higher welfare and
1This constitutional reform also stipulated among other things, agrarian reform, private property
reform and a list of rights for workers (Botero, 2006).
2The value of property and the level of income required were updated in each new Constitution
during the 19th century.
3Competence is dened as the ability to deliver more public goods for the same level of taxes.
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they are then preferred by voters. They have the incentive to do this
by manipulating scal instruments during electoral periods. One im-
portant characteristic of these signalling models is the voters incom-
plete ability to observe the overall level of spending or revenues. Were
they able to do so, they could perfectly infer politicians competence.
Drazen and Eslava (2010) proposed an alternative signalling model:
even if voters are well-informed or scal conservatives, during electoral
periods scal manipulation may be observed via the composition of
the budget (expenditure or revenues) being targeted at some particu-
lar voters at the expenses of others. If it is the composition of spending
or revenues that is manipulated for electoral purposes, rational voters
may infer something di¤erent from, or additional to, competence. In
this view, voters who are targeted before elections want to know the
incumbents competence and also whether they will be still favoured
after the election. This is a di¤erent signalling problem faced by the
voters: whether receiving high targeted expenditures before elections
signals a greater weight of their group in the incumbents objective
function than other voters groups or whether it signals the interest
of the incumbent in increasing the number of votes by targeting their
group with more expenditure or raising less revenues. Drazen and
Eslava (2010) show that even with fully rational voters, there exists
an equilibrium in which voters rationally respond to electoral years
expenditure or revenues and politicians make budgetary decisions ac-
cording to this behaviour.
Politicians target spending or revenues towards electorally attrac-
tive groups in electoral periods and choose their platform depending
on the type of voters. Based on this, we test how the characteristics
of the voters (in terms of income, education and information access)
determine politicians platforms.
Our hypothesis states that when the potential voters were a small
but well specied economic group (high income, literate and well-
informed men), politicians decided to target the expenditure that ben-
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eted them more (infrastructure) and this strategy shifted when the
characteristics of potential voters changed. After 1936, when the ma-
jority of voters were illiterate, low-income and uninformed men, in-
cumbents decided to target a di¤erent type of expenditure (social)
that mainly a¤ected this new majority. In this way, they increased
their probability of staying in power. However, eventually some mi-
norities can still have political power to make this new decision non
trivial to the politicians and thus the policy manipulation less strong
and clear in time.
We expect that the incumbent will always prefer to choose an elec-
toral platform that targets the expenditure and the revenues that ben-
et the voters most. The targetable expenditure, or revenue, changes
according to the characteristics of the majority of voters. In the Colom-
bian case, prior to 1936 when this group was homogeneous and better
informed, voters belonged to the high-income group. They were mainly
landowners and traders who were usually interested in increasing their
prots and economic activity. Although the government could directly
benet rms in several ways, voters usually requested better railroads,
highways, roads and bridges that could help to improve trade inside
and outside the country. This particular group of voters did not request
more social expenditure, such as schools or public hospitals, from the
government, since they could a¤ord this type of expenditure by them-
selves.
After 1936, when voters were on average less informed and more
heterogeneous but the majority belonged to an illerate low- or medium-
income group, the incentives for the political parties were di¤erent.
Since a higher portion of voters valued more basic or subsistence ne-
cessities, politicians preferred to focus on social expenditure (public
schools and hospitals) instead of investing in development projects.
This could also partly explain the lag in new roads and railway system
that Colombia experienced during the 20th century.
This hypothesis agrees with the results found by Lopez-Uribe and
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Espinosa (2012) in Colombia during the 19th century. They followed
presidents political careers, and showed that being Minister of In-
frastructure during this period increased the probability of becoming
President by 30% while being Minister of Education decreased it by
22%.
We keep the usual assumptions of the Political Business Cycles the-
ories: (i) politicians are identical and opportunistic (their only interest
is to remain in power) and (ii) voting rule is rationally retrospective:
voters are naive and support the incumbents based on observed out-
comes; if they are favourable, the incumbent is re-elected, otherwise
the challenger wins.4 These models assume that voters have imperfect
information about politicians competence and that they know it only
in retrospect, while politicians know their competence from the outset.
In this sense, voters base their decision on the information that is avail-
able, linked to what they observe. Hence, before elections incumbents
attempt to signal their competence and have incentives to manipulate
the public expenditure and revenues in an e¤ort to show the results
of their policies. This will increase their chances of re-election. How-
ever, the imperfection of the information, the characteristics of the
voters and the tools that politicians use to stay in power (monitoring
institutions) change between periods.
We should also note that, fortunately for us, the timing of presiden-
tial elections in the whole period under study was determined by the
constitution, even during war periods. Since independence, Constitu-
tions established the exact timing of presidential elections (two, four or
six years).5 In this sense, we can take election years as exogenous since
these were pre-determined by the law. Going even further, presidential
4Studies have criticized the characterizations of the opportunistic politician framework (see Hibb
(1977), Lohmann (1998), Rogo¤ and Sibert (1988))
5Article 102 of the 1832 constitution, article 87 of the 1843 constitution, article 27 of the 1853
constitution, article 61 of the 1858 constitution established presidential elections every four years.
Article 64 of the 1863 constitution established presidential elections every two years and article 114
of the 1886 constitution established presidential elections every six years.
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elections always took place in the rst semester of the year, and most
of them during March and May.
We focus upon the inuence of electoral cycles on scal policies
instead of dealing with how governments attempt to manipulate the
economy. It seems easier to manipulate budgets than macroeconomics
outcomes such as GDP, ination or unemployment. Economic perfor-
mance is the outcome of decisions taken by consumers, workers, pro-
ducers and others countries as well as national and local governments.
In particular, during the 19th century the economy depended mainly
on imported goods for consumption and there was not a clear mon-
etary policy or a central bank. Governments are in control of their
budgets, whereas they can only hope to have some indirect impact
on the economy. Hence, increasing spending during electoral periods
must appear a much simpler and potentially rewarding strategy than
trying to produce a business cycle through scal and monetary poli-
cies (Blais and Nadeau, 1992). As Rogo¤ (1990) has pointed out, it
is "more promising to focus empirical research for electoral cycles on
taxes, transfers and government consumption".
We limit the analysis to presidential elections based on the idea
that they have a more direct impact upon power than elections for
senators and councillors. We might expect stronger electoral cycles un-
der presidential regimes given that individual political accountability
gives stronger incentives than collective accountability (Persson and
Tabellini, 2003). This has also been proved empirically in the U.S
states by Lowry, Alt and Ferree (1998) who show that voters respond
more to policy in gubernatorial elections than in legislative ones.
To test our hypothesis we run di¤erent exercises with two groups
of dependent variables (scal policy). The variables in real terms help
to understand the changes in magnitude of the scal policies while the
variables in percentage as a fraction of total expenditure or revenues
help to understand the changes in distribution of its components.
One caveat that we should note is an overestimation of the results
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as a consequence of the time period of the law change. The 1930s was
also a decade of important changes in terms of the role of the state as a
provider of public goods. Although the notion of the welfare state was
not o¢cially established in Colombia until 1991, the idea of a major
state intervention in social issues was intensied during these years.
So, a higher social expenditure could not only be a result of the new
type of voters but of a global change of perspective. However, we run
some robustness tests showing that the main change in the political
budget cycles was around 1936 compared with the years before and
after. This result reinforces our hypothesis of the relationship between
the change in the electoral law and a di¤erent expenditure and revenue
composition in electoral periods.
This paper di¤ers from the existing literature in two di¤erent re-
spects. First, although we study just one country, we study the polit-
ical budget cycles during a longer period, starting just after indepen-
dence and ending at the beginning of the 21th century. Unlike most
existing studies, our work covers 170 years (1830-2000). Second, we
focus on the changes in the policy instruments and politicians plat-
forms when the characteristics of the voters change. Instead of giving
priority to the type of government or democracy and studying the po-
litical budget cycle with reference to those categories, we concentrate
on the particularities of voters. In this sense, we try to answer how,
depending on the characteristics of the di¤erent groups of voters, the
politicians use di¤erent policy instruments to attempt to get re-elected.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a short
historical background on Colombian politics. Section 3 briey reviews
the existing literature on political budget cycles. Section 4 describes
the data. Section 5 describes the empirical setup and section 6 presents
the results. Section 7 discusses some robustness tests. Finally, section
8 o¤ers some conclusions.
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2 Historical Background
Since Colombia became a republic and during di¤erent state forms that
it has had between the 19th century and today (the unitary state of
"Gran Colombia" (1819-1830) and "Nueva Granada" (1830-1853), the
federal Regime known as "Estados Unidos de Colombia" (1853-1886),
and the unitary state of "Republica de Colombia" (1886-today)); elec-
tions have been part of the daily life of its citizens. Some estimations
calculate more than 200 elections during this period.
Since independence, politics in Colombia has been dominated by
two strong, oppositing ideologies that became o¢cial parties in 1850,
with the names of the Conservatives and Liberals.6 Although for some
short periods these parties had internal divisions and formed di¤erent
coalitions, these were not strong enough to persist and were easily
reabsorbed into the traditional parties.7 Some politicians also tried to
establish new political parties away from the traditional ideologies and
more in line with the changes that the world had, but none prospered
and they were easily overcome by the traditional parties in elections.8
The founding and development of new political parties was not
guaranteed until the new Constitution in 1991, and nally in 2002
a candidate who did not belong to the traditional parties won the
presidential elections. Nowadays Colombia has twelve di¤erent parties
6Before 1850, the traditional parties were not o¢cially founded and named as they are today.
However, there existed two opposing political groups that are normally associated with the tradi-
tional parties in their ideologies: Bolivaristas with the Conservatives and Santanderistas with the
Liberals.
7Among the most signicatives divisions we found: Golgotas and Draconianos within the Liberal
party (Jordan Florez, 2000) and historicos and nacionalistas within the Conservative party.
8These parties include: Unión Patriótica (UP), Partido Nacional Cristiano, Alianza Democrática
M-19 (AD M-19), Nueva Fuerza Democrática, Movimiento de Salvación Nacional, Movimiento Uni-
tario Metapolítico, Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores (PST), Partido Comunista de Colombia -
Marxista Leninista (PCdeC-ML), Grupo Comunista Revolucionario (GCR), Alianza Nacional Pop-
ular (ANAPO), Unión Nacional Izquierdista Revolucionaria, Partido Socialista Revolucionario and
Unión Republicana.
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in the legislature, although all of them are ideologically associated with
one of the traditional parties.
Between 1830 and 2000, Colombia had 43 presidential elections
and 6 coups, but 5 out of the 6 lasted less than 2 years in power
and were the result of struggles by the opposition party. Only the
military dictator Gustavo Rojas Pinilla was able to stay in power for a
longer period (1953-1958), but he was defeated in the next presidential
election by the Liberal candidate.
According to the national constitutions, presidential elections were
to take place every four years for most of the period, on the date es-
tablished by the Constitution. The only exceptions were during the
"radical era" (1861-1884), when the liberal constitution established
the timing at every 2 years; and during the rst years of the "Regen-
eration era" (1886-1898), when the Conservative constitution changed
the timing to every 6 years.
During the rst years of the Republic, voting was public, using a
ballot that the voter had to sign and deposit in a secret ballot box.
This requirement changed completely in 1853 when the secret ballot
was established.
Presidents were elected through indirect vote until 1910, via a sys-
tem in which voters chose an electoral council which in turn elected the
President over the following two weeks. From1910 until now, Colom-
bian voters have used the direct vote.
The voters were an essential part of the election campaign. The
constitution always established who could vote and what the process
was, although in some important cases these decrees were renewed
or changed.9 Until 1936, the constitution specied that only literate
males older than 21 years old who were tax payers, property owners or
9For example, the 1853 constitution established direct voting without income and education
restriction, but only one election took place under these conditions before the traditional constraints
were re-established.
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industry employees could vote.10
Each Constitution established the minimum amount of money (in
terms of property or rents) required to become a voter. For example,
the constitution in 1832 recognized that all men older than 21 years
old with property valued at a minimum of $1.000 pesos or annual rent
of $500 pesos, could become voters. This minimum amount changed
with the Constitution in 1843 and once again in 1886, when the lower
minimum established $1.500 pesos for property and $500 pesos for
annual rents.
Urrutias (2010) work on urban wages during the 19th century al-
lows us to make some comparisons with these minimums. The annual
nominal wage of a doorkeeper in 1832 was $200 pesos and a minister
earned $2.400 pesos, whilst in 1886 the doorkeeper earned $250 pesos
annually and the minister $3.000 pesos. The upgrade threshold was
not an issue for the government. Since this minimum was established
based on nominal wages, the rigidity that urban wages showed dur-
ing the entire 19th century (Urrutia (2010) showed that public wages
changed only once or twice during fty or sixty years in the 19th cen-
tury) meant that there were few big real-terms changes in the threshold
of the income needed to vote.
Although historians (Posada Carbo, 1997) have argued that these
voting requirements were not rigorously enforced, we can observe an
important increase in the percentage of voters just after the change in
the law in 1936. Before 1936 around 5% of the total population voted,
and this number increased to 20% just after the law changed. Before
1936, the rest of the potential voters did not participate in politics for
cultural, economic or citizenship reasons. It has been roughly calcu-
lated that during the 19th century only 10% of adult male had the
10The Constitution of1853 established universal su¤rage, saying that all men older than 25 years
old could vote directly to elect the President. In this sense, the requirement of education and
income was eliminated. However, only one election took place under these conditions (1856), since
the Constitution in 1858 once again stipulated this restriction and the indirect vote.
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right to vote (Bushnell, 1993).
In 1936, President Lopez Pumarejo introduced universal su¤rage
for all men over 21 years old, and in 1957 Rojas Pinillas government
introduced su¤rage for women 21 years old11.
The importance of President Lopez Pumarejos government in 1934
and 1938 goes beyond this electoral policy. The centre piece of the
proposed transformation was the shift in the denition and role of
the Colombian state in the economy and the society. His government,
known as "The Revolution in Motion", promulgated constitutional,
agrarian, educational, labour and tax reforms. However, all these re-
forms, including the electoral one, had begun to be discussed under
the previous liberal government of Enrique Olaya Herrera.
In particular, the two most important newspapers in the 1930s ("El
Tiempo" and "El Espectador") had begun to claim the need to extend
the electoral su¤rage in 1931, long before Lopez Pumarejos govern-
ment started. The frequent discussions on this subject in national
newspapers and in political speeches make us think that the electoral
reform in 1936 was the consequence of a long process of debating that
ended in this particular year. In other words, 1936 was not chosen as
the year of the electoral reform for a specic reason: on the contrary,
the reform could have taken place some years before or after.
To summarize, Colombia has been a country of electoral traditions
and elections occurred with constitutional regularity. Although politi-
cal institutions were weak in some periods, traditional political parties
are well established; leading to a high degree of institutionalisation of
competitive politics.
11Women obtained this right through the Legislative Act no.3 in 1954 and exercised their right
for the rst time at the presidential elections in 1957.
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3 Literature Review
In the last three decades there have been many works in the literature
on political business cycles and political budget cycles. The pioneer-
ing work by Nordhaus (1975) considered the idea that governments
may act opportunistically by adapting scal policy to the electoral cy-
cle. He linked the opportunistic manipulation of economic policy to
election times - making decisions biased against future generations -
and showed the long-run and short-run equilibrium in the economy
when politicians face choices between present and future welfare. In
other words, "political business cycles" are dened as the possibility of
a macroeconomic cycle being induced by the political cycle (Brender
and Drazen, 2005)12.
There are two types of model in the political business cycle research.
One of these models assumes that voters are myopic, non-rational and
easily fooled by policymakers, in which case it is simple to predict
the existence of a systematic opportunistic cycles in scal policy and
macroeconomic variables. The other model rejects the irrationality of
voters, limiting the ability of government to manipulate the economy
in order to be re-elected. Nevertheless, still appears to be opportunis-
tic behaviour by policy makers as an equilibrium to a signalling game
under asymmetric information, where voters do not know the govern-
ments competence while government does.
In the structure of these models the incumbent government values
being re-elected but governments di¤er in their levels of "competence":
governments with high competence value being re-elected more highly
than governments with low competence. One important feature of
these models is the moral hazard problem: the incumbents ability to
12In this literature there are two types of model. One is the traditional opportunistic model
derived by Nordhaus (1975) and the other one, called the "rational political business cycle", incor-
porates rational expectation and suggests strategic behaviour and asymmetric information. The
most relevant works in this line are papers by Rogo¤ and Sibert (1988) and Rogo¤ (1990).
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manipulate policy instruments in order to bias the voters perception
in their favour. Another key feature is the existence of information
asymmetry. While incumbents know their level of competence, voters
can not observe it: they must try to perceive it by observing economic
outcomes, in this case the production of public goods, in retrospect.
Then, incumbents must signal their competence to voters to increase
their chances of re-election through a higher provision of public goods,
hoping that voters would attribute the increase to their competence.
This will lead to a separating equilibrium where the most competent
incumbents generate distortion of scal policies during pre-electoral
periods.
In our paper, we assume the existence of asymmetric information
on the part of the voters but assume that there are two levels of it
(one less informed that the other one): uninformed voters (after 1936)
and informed voters (before 1936). None of them observe politicianss
competence perfectly, but voters before 1936 had a better signal of it.
Rogo¤(1990) rened to these competency models to distinguish be-
tween di¤erent types of government expenditures: "current" or "visi-
ble" expenditures,the benets of which can be easily observed by voters
before elections; and "capital or "less visible" expenditures, the ben-
ets of which are less easy to observe prior to elections and which in
many cases are realized in subsequent periods. In this sense, an incum-
bent government has the incentive to focus in "visible" expenditure in
order to send as e¢cient a signal as possible about its competence. Sig-
nals must be seen to be e¤ective, and therefore it is more important for
the government to focus on areas with the most visible expenditures
instead of thinking about the timing of the benets. In our paper,
both social and infrastructure expenditure could be included in the
"visible" category while the other components (nance, institutional,
defence and debt) would be part of the "less visible" expenditure.
The evidence about political business cycles is not conclusive, and
it is di¢cult to conclude that there are signicant increases in economic
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activity before elections. Therefore, empirical studies began to focus
on cycles in policy instruments, in particular, scal expansions before
elections and contractionary policies once the election is over, known
as "Political Budget Cycles". A political budget cycle is dened as a
period of uctuation in a governments scal policies, which is induced
by the cyclicality of election (Shi and Svensson, 2003).The main idea
in this literature is that voters make their decision based on visible
economic policies. Policymakers have the incentives to stimulate the
economy with the help of scal or monetary policies in order to generate
employment gains or wealth transfers that increase theirs popularity,
but these policies have to be visible to the voters. Once the elections
are over, contractionary policies are pursued to reduce a scal decit
or ination.
The literature on political budget cycles has concentrated on the
manipulation of government expenditures by the incumbents in or-
der to get re-elected. It does not give an important role to revenues
and taxes. In these theories, voters do not support conservative gov-
ernments and they are generally not aware of the costs of increasing
public spending (Buchanan and Wagner, 1977).
As Eslava (2006) has pointed out, there are four necessary elements
for scal decits to result from the opportunistic behaviour of policy-
makers. First, policymakers must be interested in increasing votes for
their parties and must be willing to use economic policy to achieve this
objective. Second, voters must value public spending and perceive an
explicit benet to this end from the government expenditure. Third,
voters must su¤er from "scal illusion" in the sense of consistently
underestimating the future costs of current spending programs13. Fi-
nally, voters must be unable to observe all the details of the scal
budget, which depends on governments accounting practices, media
13Alesina and Perotti (1995) and Drazen (2000) have criticized the assumption that voters repeat
their mistakes in successive elections.
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development and the"sophistication" of voters.
The political budget cycles theory has two important implications
for empirical work. First, debt accumulation is larger when there is
less transparency of budgets. Second, only when scal outcomes are
not perfectly observed by voters can we nd high public expenditures
and decits in electoral periods.
Empirical works on Political Budget Cycles are extensive and have
found di¤erent evidence about the incidence of scal decits, total
expenditures and total revenues before elections. The results di¤er
between the group or country under study. For developed and less
developed countries, Persson and Tabellini (2003) did not nd any
change of government expenditure before elections. Shi and Svensson
(2006) provide an empirical analysis based on a large panel of devel-
oped and developing countries and found that, on average, the scal
decit increases by 22% in election years. However, the size of politi-
cal budget cycles is much larger in developing countries. They argue
that the main reason for this di¤erence is that in developed countries
there exist strong institutional constraints on politicians and a large
section of informed voters, which makes scal policy manipulation less
e¤ective. Similar results were found by Brender and Drazen (2005) in
a broad cross-section of democracies over the period 1960-2001. How-
ever, they highlight that the existence of a political expenditure cycle
in the scal balance is extremely sensitive to the set of countries in-
cluded and that once they drop "new democratic" countries the e¤ect
disappears. At the same time, they nd a signicant revenue cycle
(revenues fall in an election year) when they only include "old democ-
racies". Besides, Shi and Svensson (2002) underline the general idea
that the size of the electoral policy cycles depends on the features of
the country, and in this context, variations in the institutional environ-
ment can explain a large number of the di¤erences between developed
and developing countries. In the same wave, for developing countries
between 1970 and 1992, Schunknecht (1996, 2000) found increases in
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public expenditures and in scal decits in pre-electoral periods and
contractionary policies thereafter, emphasizing that these scal pol-
icy cycles are stronger in less trade-oriented economies14. Addition-
ally, Block (2002) found evidence of pre-election manipulation of scal
policies (scal decit, public expenditure, tax revenue and government
consumption as a share of GDP) in a sample of 44 Sub-Saharan African
countries between 1980-199515. An explication of this result is given
by Brender and Drazen (2005) who argue that this could happen to
"new democracies" in the rst years after their transition to democ-
racy. This might suggest that political decit cycles only emerge when
voters and the media have not yet developed the ability to monitor
scal policy.
The literature on Latin American political budget cycles has yielded
inconclusive ndings. Ames(1987) found that government expenditure
increased in the year before elections and decreased in the year after
elections for a pool of seventeen Latin America countries between 1947
and 1982. Remmer (1993) reports that the quarterly percentage change
in the scal balance is heterogeneous across eight South American
democracies during the 1980s. Mejia Acosta and Coppedge (2001), and
Amorim Neto and Borsani (2004), found that budget decits worsen
during elections but government expenditure does not increase. This
result has been strengthened recently by the work of Barberia and
Avelino (2011) who argue that the increase in the decit and the s-
cal di¢culties during elections are mainly driven by the reluctance of
governments to increase taxes.
Studies focused on particular countries and on particular political
levels (national, regional or municipal) have found, in general, that the
share of votes obtained by the incumbents party is negatively related
14He also found that natural catastrophes a¤ect current expenditure, probably through expendi-
ture on emergency relief and improvements in the terms of trade decrease current expenditure.
15He also found strong evidence of political business cycles in monetary policy. In particular,
election years see faster monetary expansions and lower nominal interest rates.
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to the level of government spending and/or the scal decit observed
just before elections, but they do not agree on the changes in the
expenditure composition before elections.
In this sense, at municipal level in Israel Brender (2005) found be-
tween 1989-1998 that voters reward high expenditure in development
projects and education expenditure (measured as the education sys-
tems performance), but they penalized increases in decits16. Similar
results were found in Canada by Kneebone and McKenzie (2001) where
there was a clear electoral cycle in revenues and spending: in particular,
an increase in education, transportation, recreation and culture spend-
ing and a decrease in spending in health, social services and industrial
development during electoral years. At national level, Gonzalez (2002)
did not nd evidence of pre-electoral increases in aggregate spending in
Mexico, but there are indications that just before elections, spending
on social services and health increase while the increase in investment
in infrastructure starts early in the pre-election period. In addition,
in Mexico Gamez and Ibarra-Yunez (2009) and in Russia Akhmedov
and Zhuravskaya (2004)17 examined the existence of an expansionary
political cycle in regional public expenditure during election years and
a contractionary cycle in post-electoral years, but they did not nd
evidence of a cyclical behaviour in infrastructure spending in electoral
years.
Nevertheless, Khemani (2004) has found in local governments in
India that public expenditure on investment areas rises before elec-
tions; Faal (2007) found pre-election manipulation of scal instru-
ments, mainly development spending and overall primary expenditure,
in Papua New Guinea during 1988-2004; Vega (2004) reports increases
16In particular, Brender (2005) found that the scal perfomance was only relevant in the 1998
campaign when the political environment changed.
17Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya (2004) also found evidence that the magnitude of the cycles de-
creases with education, urbanization, level of democracy, transparency and freedom of media and
also that cycles have become smaller over time.
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in infrastructure projects before elections in Portugal; Medina (2003)
concludes that scal decit and capital expenditure increased in elec-
tion years at provincial level in Argentina during 1985-2001; and Lar-
rain and Assael (1997) found qualitative evidence of increases in scal
decits in Chile before elections in the period 1939-1993. For Colombia,
the works of Eslava (2006) and Drazen and Eslava (2005) at munici-
pal level, for the period 1987-2000 have shown that the share of votes
received by the incumbent party in elections increases with capital
expenditures and decreases with scal decits.
In contrast to previous studies we use disaggregated data on the
government budget of a single country. This allows us to run a series
of regressions using 15 di¤erent budget items as dependent variables.
Compared to the previous literature our data set is also larger, in the
sense that we have homogenized scal policy variables for 170 years
(from Independence up to today). This data enables us to examine
sustainable changes in political budget cycles. The major di¤erence
with respect to the previous literature is that we concentrate on the re-
lationship between di¤erent types of voters and political budget cycles
instead of focusing on the relationship between the latter and political
regimes.
4 The Data
The information was taken directly from the National General Archives,
National Library, Luis Angel Arango Library and Departamento Ad-
ministrativo Nacional de Estadistica (DANE). The database holds in-
formation in standard format between 1831 and 2000.
The national annual series of scal instruments and outcomes comes
from di¤erent sources: Informes del secretario de Hacienda al Congreso
(1841-1844, 1846-1859), Memoria del Ministro de Hacienda (1860-
1895, 1904), Liquidaciones de los Presupuestos de Rentas y Gastos
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(1831-1848, 1853-1860, 1870-1878, 1884-1892, 1895-1896, 1899-1902),
Informes Especiales del Secretario de Hacienda (1863-1867, 1874-1875,
1877-1882) and Boletines de Estadistica (1915-2000). For the years
that the information was missing, we used o¢cial newspapers asGaceta
de la Nueva Granada (1840-1848), Gaceta Ocial (1849-1861), Registro
Ocial (1862-1864) and Diario Ocial (1865-1915). We also reviewed
the information provided by Soto (1837) and Galindo (1874) for the
years prior to 1840.
The database has information on total revenues and expenditure
liquidated and their respective disaggregated components. For the
years where the expenditure was biannual (1886-1909), we checked the
Diario Ocial daily and sum up any addition that was included to the
original budget.
We aggregate the di¤erent categories of revenues and expenditure
in order to homogenize them across time. For the revenues, we com-
press the information into ve categories: indirect taxes (customs and
consumption taxes), direct taxes (income and land taxes), fees and
nes from public services (institutional fees), transfers and contribu-
tions from national properties (monopolies and national properties that
were sold) and treasury balance resources (revenues left from the previ-
ous year). The expenditure was aggregated in six categories: Finance
(including spending related to collection of taxes), Institutional (in-
cluding justice, diplomatic and legislative spending), Social (including
education, health and cultural spending), Infrastructure (including in-
vestment and development projects), Defence (military spending) and
National Debt (interest). We also include scal decit as a dependent
variable .
Once we had all the real variables, we decided to separate the data
into two groups in order to test the hypothesis of political budget
cycles: real variables and percentage as a fraction of total expenditure
and total revenues. For each of these groups we ran exercises taking
into account di¤erent time periods: 1. The entire period, to study the
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relationship between the change in the law in 1936 and the elections
with the scal policy variables and 2. Separately, before and after the
law was changed (1936) in order to get the sign and signicance of the
relationship between elections and scal policy for each period.
We check the stationarity of all the variables using the augmented
Dickey Fuller Test of unit root. We run this test for each variable in
three di¤erent time periods: 1830-2000, 1830-1936 and 1937-2000. No
variable was I(2). Those that resulted being I(1) were converted to
stationary variables using rst di¤erences and the unit root test was
run again to assure that all the variables were I(0)18.
Out of 170 years we did not nd information for revenues in seven
years (1841, 1845, 1846, 1868, 1870, 1886, 1903) and for expenditure
in six years (1831, 1832, 1886, 1905, 1906, 1907). In these years we
used the Newton Interpolation to complete the series. This method
calculates the value of the revenues and expenditures for the missing
years (y) nding the closer values between two known points (y0; x0)
and (y1;x1) such that x0 < x and x1 > x where y0 and y1 are observed
and calculating:
y =
y1 y0
x1   x0
(x  x0) + y0
Before using our price index, we converted the variables that were in
the reales currency into pesos. According to Camacho Roldan (1871),
the conversion was approximately 8 reales to 1 peso. Although the
law of June 2, 1846 was the rst one regarding currency units and
nominated the real de plata as the o¢cial currency, this conversion
18For the period 1830-2000 the nonstationary variables are: total expenditure, nance expendi-
ture, social expenditure, infrastructure expenditure, defence expenditure, debt expenditure, social
percentage, infrastructure percentage, total revenues, direct taxes, indirect taxes, direct taxes per-
centage, indirect taxes percentage, national properties percentage. For the period 1830-1936 they
are: infrastructure expenditure, infrastructure percentage, total revenues, direct taxes, indirect
taxes, direct percentages, indirect percentages, fees and nes percentages, national properties per-
centage. For the period 1936-2000 the nonstationary variables are the same as for the entire period,
plus the nance percentage and the treasury balances resources revenues.
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was used from1847. The data appears in this currency until 1853
when the government returned to the currency unit granadino o peso
de 10 reales (Vergara and Vergara, 1915).
Besides, at the end of the hyperination (1903) prices had multi-
plied by 40 compared to 1899 levels, and to stabilize them a new rate
of $100 for $1 peso oro was established in 1905 (Ocampo, 1998). Thus,
we converted the data for these years into pesos oro.
The Urrutia-Ruiz Price Index for the 19th century was interpolated
using a Newton interpolation with the Ocampo Trade Index (1998) for
the years that were missing. This was then homogenized to the same
year base (1878) for the 20th century with the GRECO (2002) price
index and ination rate.
The nominal GDP for the 19th century series was taken from
Kalmanovitz and Lopez (2009) and that for the 20th century from
GRECO (2002). The population series was constructed using census
data and GRECO estimations. Once we had the complete series of
GDP, we estimated the cyclical component using di¤erent lters: Ho-
drick and Prescott, Baxter and King, Christiano and Fitzgerald and
Butterworth, and we generated a new variable that measures the dif-
ference between the cyclical component and the trend. This new vari-
able captures time variation in scal policy due to shocks to aggregate
output and income.
Information about elections, party hegemonies, wars, constitutions
and coups were taken from Gaceta de la Nueva Granada (1840-1848),
Gaceta Ocial (1849-1861), Registro Ocial (1862-1864) and Diario
Ocial (1865-2000) and from Urrutia and Arrubla (1970).
22
5 Empirical Strategy
5.1 First estimation
As we focus on the manipulation of policy tools instead of the changes
in macroeconomic variables, we must test the existence of cycles in
spending, revenues and decit rather than looking directly at the be-
haviour of real variables.
The analysis of the changes in expenditure and revenues in electoral
years according to the type of voter begins with a simple specication.
This allows us to verify how politicians react in electoral periods to
changes in scal variables when only a small portion of the population
could vote (only educated and high-income men older than 21 years
old), compared to periods when a higher proportion of the population
can vote and their characteristics are more heterogeneous (all men older
than 18 years old)19. We are interested in the sign and magnitude of the
relationship between electoral and scal policy variables. We estimate
the following equation for the two periods separated (1830-1936 and
1937-2000):
fiscal_policyt = 0i + 1it+ 2ioutputgapt + 3ifiscal_policyt 1
+4ielectiont+i + 
0
5it + "ti
where fiscal_policyt is each component of the expenditures and
revenues in real terms or the percentage as a fraction of the total
19For the non-stationary variables, we applied rst di¤erences in order to proceed with a dynamic
specication in di¤erences. This specication was applied by Levitt (1997) in his work on electoral
cycles in police hiring. Thus, we ended up estimating the following equation:
fiscal_policyt = 0 + 1t+ 2outputgapt + 3fiscal_policyt 1 + 4electiont+i + 
0
5t + "t
where we rst di¤erence the dependent variable -measured initially in levels or as a percentage-.
In this sense, we put more structure on the data for the identication of the election e¤ect.
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expenditure, t is a trend that measures the e¤ect of time on the de-
pendent variable, outputgapt is a measure of cyclical deviations from
GDP trend in year t, since scal instruments tend to be highly cyclical.
The variable electiont+i takes the value 1 if in the year t a presidential
election took place and 0 otherwise and where i = f 2; 1; 0; 1g : In
the case when i =  2 the variable takes the value 1 in the rst and
second year before elections (not only in the second year), in order to
test for the existence of a consistent and longer e¤ect of elections20.
t is a matrix that includes others controls: the variable hegemonyt that
takes the value 1 if the conservative party was in power in year t and
0 if it was the liberal or a dictator; the variable wart takes the value
1 if in year t there was a civil war and 0 otherwise21; the variable
constitutiont takes the value 1 in the years where a new constitution
was established and 0 otherwise22, the variable coupt takes the value
1 in the years where there was a coup and 0 otherwise, the dummy
d_1910 takes the value 1 in 1910 and 0 otherwise and measures the
change from the indirect to the direct voting system and the variable
d_1957 takes the value 1 in 1957 and 0 otherwise and measures the
year that womens su¤rage was introduced. We are interested in the
coe¢cient 4; which measures the relation between elections (including
periods before and after) and scal policy variables.
20This variable was also constructed for the year of the election t and for two years before elections
t  2 (this includes t  1 and t  2).
21During the 19th century, Colombia had 9 civil wars and just four of them lasted just one
year, two lasted two years, two lasted three years and one lasted four years. Hence, we have 18
observations with value 1. The length of the wars was taken from Vergara y Gaitan (1866), Espana
(1985) and Pardo (2004).
22In total there were 7 constitutions: 1832, 1843, 1853, 1858, 1863, 1886 and 1991. In years
where there was an interim pact (as in 1861) or partial changes to the constitution (as during
Reyes government) we established the value 0, since these changes did not generate important
changes in the political, economic or electoral system and their e¤ects and scope were lower than
during periods of constitutional change.
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5.2 Second Estimation
Our hypothesis states that depending on the type of voters politicians
choose a di¤erent platform to increase their probability of being re-
elected. In our approach, we proxy the type of potential voters accord-
ing to the period of time (before or after 1936). In this sense, the e¤ect
of elections may depend on the year. In all the years up to and includ-
ing 1936, voters can be associated with literate and high-income men,
and after 1936 they are associated with a more heterogeneous group,
with a majority of illiterate and low- and medium-income voters.
The new specication is:
fiscal_policyt = 0i + 1it+ 2ioutputgapt + 3i(fiscal_policyt 1)
+4i (d_1936  electiont+i) + 5ielectiont+i + 6id_1936
+07it + "ti
where (fiscal_policyt) is the percentage as a fraction of the total
expenditure or revenues or the logarithm of the scal policy variables
in real terms. The logarithmic transformation was done in order to
reduce variance. The variable d_1936 is a dummy that takes the value
1 for the years between 1937 and 2000 and the value 0 for the years
between 1830 and 1936. The rest of the variables are the same.
We are interested in the coe¢cient 4, which measures whether the
relationship between elections and scal policy variables is di¤erent
before or after 1936.
6 Empirical Evidence
Tables I to V report OLS estimations and p-values for di¤erent depen-
dent variables. Table I shows results when the dependent variable is
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total expenditure, table II when they are infrastructure expenditure
and social expenditure, table III for the other components of expen-
diture ( nance, institutional, defence and debt) and decit, table IV
when the dependent variable is total revenues, and table V for each of
the revenues components.
All of the tables have the same structure. For each one, column
(1) indicates the period that is included in the estimation (1830-1936,
1937-2000, 1830-2000). Columns (2) to (9) indicate di¤erent values of
the variable electiont+i where i 2 f 2; 1; 0; 1g : Columns (2) and
(3) reports the results when i =  223, columns (4) and (5) when
i =  1; columns (6) and (7) when i = 0 and columns (8) and (9)
when i = 1: For each combination of the dependent variable and the
election variable we ran two types of regressions: without24 controls
and with controls.
For each dependent variable we report separate estimates of 4 in
equation (1) for the periods 1830-1936 and 1937-2000 in real terms and
as percentage (when is not total expenditure or revenues variable).
We also present separate estimates of the interaction coe¢cient 4
in equation (2) for the entire period 1830-2000. These estimates are
reported in real terms (log) and as percentages. Variables in absolute
terms help to understand changes in magnitude, while variables in
percentage terms let us study changes in distribution of its components
and make comparisons between them.
Equation (2) allows us to estimate the relation between elections
and scal policy variables before and after the electoral reform. Here,
the interaction coe¢cient, 4; shows the di¤erence between electoral
and non-electoral years regarding scal policy variables for the two
periods under study (i.e. before and after 1936). The coe¢cient 5
23Strictly, column (2) and (3) are a dummy variable which take the value 1 one and two years
before elections. We decided to include both years to study persistence in the changes made by the
budget.
24In the regressions without controls we only included the trend and cyclical component.
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shows the di¤erence in scal policy variables between electoral and
non-electoral years before 1936. Likewise, the coe¢cient 6 shows the
di¤erence before and after 1936 for non-electoral years. We only report
results for 4
Hence, each cell in each table is the 4 coe¢cient or 4 interaction
coe¢cient for the respective combination of scal policy variable and
election variable (columns). Signicant results are highlighted and p-
values are in parentheses. We report all the outcomes independently
of the signicance.
6.1 Total Expenditure
Table I reports the relationship between electoral years and total ex-
penditure for the three periods of study and with di¤erent measures
of the dependent variable. Panel a. shows the estimates of 4 for the
two periods of study (1830-1936, 1937-2000) and panel b shows the
estimates of 4 for the entire period (1830-2000).
The estimate results indicates a clear and strong expenditure cy-
cle before 1936 in pre-electoral years. This table indicates that total
expenditure increases by around 2,000,000 pesos in pre-election years,
but decreases by 1,300,000 pesos in election years. Compared to the
sample average, pre-election years can explain a 21% (for one and two
years before elections) and a 32% (for just one year before elections)
increase in total expenditure, and post-election years can explain an
18% decrease in total expenditure. This nding is consistent with the
evidence found in developing countries for the recent years (Gonzalez,
2002; Brender and Drazen, 2005; Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya, 2004).
For the second period (1937-2000), results shift considerably. Total
expenditure only increases in election years but it does not change
signicantly before elections. In real terms, during election years total
expenditure rises by 17,000,000 pesos on average compared to non-
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elections years. In terms of the sample average, during these years
total expenditure grows by 9.4%.
If we compare the two political budget cycles (before and after
1936) in terms of the sample average, the rst e¤ect is twice that of
the second one (21% vs 9.4%), showing a strong cycle before 1936. This
could be a consequence, amongst other things, of a greater exibility
available to the government when controlling the budget, and of fewer
government monitoring agencies before 1936.
Results in panel b. reinforce the ndings: a decrease in total ex-
penditure in pre-electoral years and an increase in electoral years after
1936 (smaller and signicant only at 10%). This estimation also high-
lights an important change in terms of the timing and size of the cycle.
Before 1936, political cycles start in the pre-election period, but this
trend changes to the election year after 1936. Besides, the cycles size
is bigger before 1936 compared to the ones observed after 1936.
We can also follow the theory applied by Brender and Drazen (2005)
about new and established democracies and try to study the Colombian
case as a process, which started when the country became a republic
and then evolved towards an established democracy. In this case, each
new election is a further step in consolidating democracy in the country.
Thus, according to their results and our ndings in panel b., we can
expect stronger political budget cycles before 1936 than after.
6.2 Infrastructure and Social Expenditure
Table II reports OLS estimates and p-values for equations 1 and 2. The
table presents two panels. Panel A. shows di¤erent results when the
dependent variable is infrastructure expenditure and panel B. when
the dependent variable is social expenditure. Within each panel we
present estimates with di¤erent measures of the dependent variable.
Sub-panels a and b report 4 coe¢cient in equation (1) for the two
periods of study when the dependent variable is measured in real terms
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and as a percentage of the total expenditure, and sub-panels c. and d.
report 4 interaction coe¢cient in equation (2) for the entire period
when the dependent variable is measured in real terms (log) and as a
percentage of the total expenditure.
As table I showed, there is a clear cycle in total expenditure. The
results in table II allow us to distinguish which of the di¤erent compo-
nents this additional expenditure was used for.
As this table indicates, before 1936 the expenditure excess was used
to increase the infrastructure expenditure (panel A.).This component
rises in real terms in pre-election years and decreases during election
years (sub-panel a.). The result is also consistent with the percentages
(sub-panel b.), where is shown that only this expenditure increases its
participation before elections.
These ndings are rst approximations that corroborate our hy-
pothesis about how the scal policy instruments in election times de-
pend on the characteristics of voters. Politicians prefer to focus on in-
frastructure expenditure instead of others expenditures to attract more
potential voters. The infrastructure spending was related to invest-
ment projects to build roads or railways that help to reduce distances
and improve the transportation system and communication between
regions. These projects mostly beneted traders and landowners who
were interested in increasing their prots and expanding their markets.
According to Valencia (1988) and Perez (1942), during pre-industrial
times in Colombia, this expenditure was viewed as the main mecha-
nism to achieve development given the isolation of the regions and their
e¤ect on the economy. In this sense "the promises of more infrastruc-
ture expenditure were used as political platforms" (Valencia, 1988). Be-
sides, the expenditure on investment projects had an immense e¤ect
on commercial activities. For example, in 1878 a local newspaper ("El
Telegrafo") published the proposal of a group of traders, entrepre-
neurs, importers-exporters and landowners. In this publication, they
criticized the governments use of public resources and proposed build-
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ing new roads and bridges to connect their region and stimulate trade
(Valencia, 1993).
The results before 1936 also show that infrastructure expenditure
decreases during election years. We can explain this change by the
date of elections. Presidential elections in Colombia have always taken
place in the rst semester of the year. Then, once an election has
occurred, politicians who are then in power try to compensate for the
excess of expenditure of the previous years by delaying or eliminating
existing or new projects.
For the period 1937-2000, infrastructure spending results non-signicant
in any of the di¤erent elections estimates. This results indicates that
this expenditure was not a priority for the government in electoral
periods and was not used as a mechanism to attract new voters.
When we include the entire sample and estimate the interaction
coe¢cient 4 in equation (2) our hypothesis is reinforced: both mea-
sures of infrastructure expenditure decrease in pre-election years for
the years after 1936 compared with the years before 1936.
Panel B reports the results when the dependent variable is social
expenditure. Before 1936 there are not signicant changes in social
expenditure for any of the estimations.
This nding is also consistent with the hypothesis about the focus
of expenditure according to the types of voter. The main beneciaries
of this expenditure were the illiterate and low-income population, who
were not potential voters. Hence, politicians did not have any incen-
tives to increase this expenditure in electoral periods nor to include it
in their platforms.
This trend changed after 1936, although the cycle is not as strong
as the one of regarding infrastructure spending. For the period 1937-
2000, social expenditure is the only type of expenditure that increases
signicantly during elections. The results show an increase of 8,414,090
pesos in real terms and of 14% in terms of the sample average. This
is consistent with the hypothesis that politicians prefer to focus on
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a form of expenditure that benets the majority of voters, which in
this case is social programs (education and health), not investment
projects.
Although for some historians the denition of social expenditure
during the 19th century is unclear, disaggregated reports of this ex-
penditure make clear how it was distributed. Social expenditure was
divided into two main categories: education and charity. The rst
category, education, had more than 70% of the total social expen-
diture, which was distributed mainly amongst primary and secondary
schools across the country (paying teachers and rents and building new
schools). The second was used to pay the maintenance of public hos-
pitals and charity houses. The existence of a clear social expenditure
and its importance could also be observed in the common idea among
politicians about the necessity of education as one of the best ways to
generate economic growth and better standards of livings. However,
despite the usual highlighting of education by politicians, there is no
evidence of an increase in this expenditure during electoral years before
1936.
Once again, when we use the entire sample, the results still hold:
social expenditure, mainly education and health spending, increases
in election times for the years after the new law was established com-
pared with the period when voters were a limited group. This result
is signicant whether it is measured as a percentage or as logarithm.
The signicance of the results in both panels of the table II rein-
forces our hypothesis about the change in expenditure composition by
the characteristics of potential voters.
With respect to the timing of the cycle, the explanation of the
change between the two periods is related to the type of expenditure
on which politicians choose to focus. In accordance with the results
of Gonzalez (2002) and Block (2002), the increase in investment in in-
frastructure started relatively early in the pre-election period: mean-
while social expenditure tends only to increase in election years (the
months before elections).
6.3 Other Expenditures and Decit.
Table III reports results obtained from equation 1 and 2 for other types
of expenditure (nance, institutional, defence and debt) and decit.
In general, there is not a clear cycle in most of these components or
the decit. This result supports our previous ndings, demonstrating
that the increase observed during electoral periods in total expenditure
was spent mainly on infrastructure before 1936 and on social goals after
1936.
Panel A. indicates the absence of a cycle in the nance expenditure
in any period or electoral year.
Panel B. reports the results for institutional expenditure, which
is associated with bureaucratic spending. Estimates from equation 1
(sub-panel a. and b.) did not show a clear cycle in the two di¤er-
ent periods. However, estimates from equation 2 indicates that one
year before elections this expenditure decreases after 1936, compared
with the years before 1936. This trend shifts during election years,
as institutional expenditure increases after 1936. These results can be
interpreted in terms of a change in the timing of payments for political
favours. Before 1936, these payments took place before elections (as
a prepayment) in order to attract new voters and increase the proba-
bility of staying in power. After 1936, they occurred in elections years
(often once the election was underway) as a mechanism to pay favours
(nancing of political campaign) once the candidate got to power.
Panel C. shows the results when the dependent variable is defence
expenditure. There is no clear cycle in this component. The only
interesting result is the decrease before elections after 1936 compared
with the period 1830-1936.
Panel D. presents the results when the dependent variable is debt.
This indicates that before elections this component increases, but dur-
32
ing election years after 1936 it decreases compared with the years before
the electoral reform. In this component there is also a change in the
timing between the two periods. In terms of the importance of the
component within the budget (measured by the percentage variable),
before 1936 interests payments are less important in the budget dur-
ing pre-electoral periods but once elections are over, this component
reaches almost the weight that it had before. The opposite occurs for
the period after 1936: before elections this component becomes more
important but during elections years this importance is lost. The size
of change between the two periods is also di¤erent: while the change
before 1936 is around 3%, after 1936 it is only 0.6%. We do not observe
signicant changes when we estimate equation (1) for the two periods
separately but estimates of equation (2) are signicant.
Finally, panel E reports the results for decit. This variable increase
in pre-electoral periods before 1936 and decreases in post-electoral pe-
riods after 1936.The growth in the variable before 1936 could explain
the di¤erence between the increase in total expenditure versus the in-
crease in total revenues before elections. Since not all the increase in
expenditure could be compensated for by more revenues (the increase
in expenditure was around 25% and that in revenues around 14%), the
excess was obtained from other resources despite all the constraints.
This could come from rich local landowners that lend small quantities
of money to the government. The rise in the public decit observed
during these years is consistent with some of the literature (Shi and
Svensson, 2006; Block, 2002).
6.4 Revenues
Table IV shows estimations for each election year variable when the
dependent variables are the total revenues in real terms and in logs for
di¤erent periods (1830-1936, 1937-2000, 1830-2000). The estimation
shows the existence of a revenue cycle one year before elections for the
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period 1830-1936, mainly, as we will see later, due to an increase in the
collection of indirect taxes (the most important revenue at that time).
Before 1936, there is an increase in total revenues only one year
before elections25. In real terms, total revenues increase on average
by 727.912 pesos one year before elections. Evaluated at the sample
average, the results imply that elections can explain a 14% increase in
total revenues during pre-election times.
After 1936, the results indicate that total revenues did not change
signicantly during electoral periods and the inexistence of a revenue
cycle. This result could be a consequence of major access to credit
markets, making it easier for the government to obtain extra resources
through debt instead of taxes during electoral periods. This new rev-
enue source is less visible for the voters than higher taxes, and in some
instances it is institutionally cheaper and easier to obtain than the
traditional revenues.
Estimates when total revenues is the dependent variable from equa-
tion (2) are presented in panel b. These outcomes conrm the previous
results. There is an important change in the revenue cycle before and
after 1936 in the timing of the cycle. Total revenues decrease in pre-
electoral periods after 1936 compared with previous years but they
increase during electoral periods, although this increase is smaller and
only signicant at 10% with controls.
Table V reports estimates obtained from equation 1 and 2 for dif-
ferent revenues components.
Panel A indicates that the percentage of direct taxes decreased in
election years after 1936, and decreased in log terms in pre-election
years for the same period. This may be due to the late creation of
its main component, i.e income tax (established by law 56 of 1918 but
only applied from 1922) which makes the comparison of this variable
between the two periods di¢cult.
25This increase is also signicant two years before elections at a10.2% signicance level.
34
Panels B and C show that, before 1936 the extra revenues came
mainly from indirect taxes and fees and nes, which increase on average
583,665 pesos and 106,255 pesos respectively. Again, in terms of the
sample average, this means that, in these years, indirect taxes and fees
and nes augmented 20% and 22% respectively due to the electoral
process.
Public revenues have two important characteristics during this pe-
riod: 1. Highly dependent of customs and undiversied: until the
process of industrialization began in Colombia during the 1920s, more
than 70% of total revenues were obtained from customs taxes (Gonza-
les and Calderon, 2002). 2. Limited access to credit: during the 19th
century, Colombia experienced serious problems accessing internal and
external credit markets. This restriction translates into greater scal
instability and fewer options during times of crisis. The constraints
started to be overcome during the 1920s when the Kemmerer Com-
mission (Junguito, 2009; López, 1992) organized the national admin-
istration and the central bank, carried out a technical revision of the
administration and supervision of tax collection, and helped to create
a national institution for this purpose.
Thus, if the government wanted more revenues, it had to search for
mechanisms other than credit to obtain them26. These other resources
came from revenues that already existed as customs or fees.
Reviewing all the laws in public newspapers such as La Gaceta
Ocial, El Registro Ocial, El Diario Ocial y La Gaceta de la Nueva
Granada, we found few increases in the customs tari¤s, reecting
their stability. Most increases occurred one year after a presidential
election27. In general, we could nd only small tari¤ changes regarding
specic types of imported goods. This fact was reinforced by Ocampo
(2007), who points out that few laws completely changed the tari¤s.
26The central bank was founded in 1923 and since then, and in particular during the 1930s,
Colombia started an intense e¤ort, within the international markets, to restore investor condence.
27The years of the main tari¤ reforms are 1844, 1861, 1873, 1886, 1913 and 1931.
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This means that revenues did not increase before elections due to
higher tari¤s but because of higher collection rates. The means used to
collect more revenues was to increase those rents that were exible in
the collection and were getting less than their potential: in some years,
the customs revenues collected only 25% of what they were supposed
to collect (El Tiempo, May 22th 1855). In this sense, this was a target
revenue for the government.
Besides, the principal problem in the collection was smuggling, and
the people most a¤ected by this crime were traders, who were also
potential voters. According to Laurent (2008), this problem underlines
the states ine¢ciency at improving controls and taking action, but at
the same time it was an example of its exibility: with low e¤ort and
money the collection rate could be increased. This seems a reasonable
way to obtain more revenues during electoral periods.
Panel B and C also show the results when the dependent variable
is measured as a percentage of total revenues. The results do not show
big changes in the composition of revenues in electoral periods before
1936. This may be explained by the increase in the total revenues
found before. As total revenues, indirect taxes and fees and nes grew
in similar proportions, it was not necessary to redistribute the existing
revenues.
Related to the estimates of equation 2, we nd that the sign of
the coe¢cient of the log of indirect taxes is consistent with what we
found in equation 1 for the two periods, but is not signicant. The
non-taxable revenue from fees and nes tend to decrease both one and
two years before elections for the years after 1936 compared with the
previous ones.
For the period 1830-1936, we can observe in panel D a decrease in
the participation of "national properties", which is a non-tax revenue,
in pre-election and post-election times, but an increase in electoral
years. These revenues comprise the state monopolies (mainly salt and
tobacco) during the 19th century and the exploitation of mines and
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oil concessions during the 20th century. They also includes the rents
received from the sale of national properties, and transfers. The level
of this revenue increases before and after elections for the years after
1936, but decreases in electoral years in the same period. This trend is
compared with the other period (1937-2000) when we estimate equa-
tion 2. We nd an important change in the variables performance
after 1936. This variable increases in pre-electoral and post-electoral
years but decreases in electoral years after 1936.
We nd almost the opposite performance for the variable Treasury
Balance Resources (panel E.), although most of the results are not
signicant.
7 Robustness Analysis
Natural concerns with the empirical strategy include potential overes-
timates arising from possibly endogenous elections, spurious relation-
ships or other shifts in the priorities or role of the central government.
This section presents some robustness checks that address these con-
cerns.
First, it could be the case that the investment projects were so many
and permanent before 1936 that Colombia built a good infrastructure
system and then it was not necessary to invest in important and ambi-
tious projects any more; hence the government could change priorities
afterwards. At the same time, we might argue that before 1936 the
government and politicians did not care about education and health or
that the government role in this aspect was not well-dened and they
had other priorities.
With respect to the rst concern, the answer would be pretty obvi-
ous for anyone who travels within the country. Today, Colombia does
not have any national rail system and the gap in this regard is huge
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when we compare statistics with other similar countries in the region.
Travel from the centre to the north (Caribbean) coast takes around 18
hours by car, and it is necessary to cross all the Andean mountains
on narrow and deteriorating roads. In addition, as has been the case
since the 19th century, transport from the Colombian coast to Bogota
is more expensive than from New York City to the north coast. Even
when it was clear that the country was falling behind in terms of in-
frastructure, few initiatives were taken by the central government, and
even fewer succeeded.
Recent years have been a new awakening by the central govern-
ment after the country signed a free trade agreement with the United
States28. Industrial and agricultural sectors started to press the gov-
ernment to move forward important investment projects in roads and
ports that will reduce transport costs and increase competitiveness.
The response of the current government was to announce investment
projects over $2 billions over the next couple of years.
The deciencies of the country in this respect could be clearer when
we compare it with other countries in the region. Table VI shows the
number of kilometres per capita of roads and the total routes-km of
rail lines for most countries in Latin America during a year in the last
decade. As the table points out, Colombia has one of the lowest levels
of roads per person (only above Brazil) and of routes per km of rail
lines. This suggests that the infrastructure expenditure must not have
been a concern of the government in the past, and that it is not correct
to think that this was a minimal problem after 1936 to the extent that
politicians had no need to focus on this type of spending.
With respect to concerns about the importance of social expendi-
ture before 1936, we can focus mainly on the role of the government in
the education system. As Ramirez and Salazar (2007) and Jaramillo
(1980) have pointed out: although Colombia had one of the lowest
28The Colombian Free Trade Agreement was signed in 2006 but came into force on May 2012.
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education levels in the 19th century (even lower than the Latin Amer-
ican level) and its expansion during this period was low; education in
its three levels, primary, intermediate and superior had been one of
the principal interests since the rst republican government of Boli-
var. Table VII shows the proportion of students enrolled in primary
school/population from the beginning of the Republic up to 1905 and
indicates that this proportion increased more than twofold during this
period. Table VIII shows the di¤erence between public and private
schools and indicates the relative importance of the former compared
to the latter. Besides, the table claries that most of the schools were
public instead of private.
The role of the government in education was also observable in their
policies to expand higher education in the country, and in the fact that
the most important public universities were founded during the 19th
century. It was clear to the government how important education was
for achieving development. Most of the politicians of that time, inde-
pendently of their ideology, highlight, in their political speeches, the
importance of education for the society and the role of the government
to boost it. At the time, the huge importance of education for devel-
opment was clear, and in this sense the discussion focused on the role
that the Church should have in it.
Another important concern is the year when the law changed. The
1920s and 1930s were important decades for social movements that
claimed a new role for the State and new rights (in terms of labour
conditions and equality). Although Colombia was not much of an
open country ideologically speaking, many of these ideas arrived in
the country and their impact was perceived in the frequency on the
newspapers highlights. It is di¢cult to settle on a particular year to
test this e¤ect, since these were two decades of di¤erent movements
and ideologies. However, we can try to separate the e¤ect of the global
movement from the e¤ect of the electoral law, by changing the dummy
year variable (varying the year from 1936). If the e¤ect is the same
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in terms of magnitude when we move the dummy variable a few years
earlier or later, we can argue that the main e¤ect was not due to
1936 by itself but instead due to a more general e¤ect that occurred
throughout the decade, such as the labour and social movements.
Table IX shows the results for the main variables of the hypothesis
(infrastructure and social expenditure) when we change the dummy
year (four years before and after the change in the law) in order to
see if, when we take an additional election or we drop the previous
one, the coe¢cients change in magnitude. If it is true that 1936 was
a random year or the result of a bigger change in an ideological trend,
we would expect similar results if we include one more or one fewer
election, as the estimates will capture a general e¤ect in no particular
year. However, if we observe small di¤erences in the magnitude and
smaller coe¢cients in both new estimates, the validity of regarding
1936 as the year of change will be higher. It is important to note that
we can only expect small di¤erences in the coe¢cient because these are
associated with an average of many years and we are only increasing
or reducing a small portion of the variable (4 years).
As table IX indicates, the new estimates for the dummy year in 1932
and 1940 are consistent with the estimates in table I and II in terms
of the sign of coe¢cients and signicance. However, all the coe¢cients
are strictly smaller than in the original regressions, showing that the
strongest e¤ect is concentrated around 1936. This suggests that the
change in the target expenditures is not a result of a general change in
an ideological trend, but that it is linked specically to 1936.
To reinforce the results, we also ran the main regressions elimi-
nating the periods with elections every two years (1861-1884). The
importance and signicance of the main results do not change when
we exclude these years. Total expenditure increases in pre-electoral
years before 1936 and in electoral years after 1936; social expenditure
increases in election years after 1936; and infrastructure expenditure
increases in pre-electoral years before 1936.
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8 Conclusions
The objective of this work is to analyse how the change in electoral
legislation in 1936, regarding the characteristics of voters, a¤ects scal
policy in electoral periods. Using a new Colombian data set (1830-
2000) we estimate OLS equations and interpret the size and magnitude
of the interaction coe¢cient. We nd the existence of Political Budget
Cycles in Colombian history. These cycles are stronger in expenditure
than in revenues.
In line with our hypothesis, we also show that before the elec-
toral legislature was reformed in 1936, total expenditure increased in
pre-electoral periods and this increase was due mainly to higher in-
frastructure spending. This pattern changed after 1936, since when
total expenditure has increased only in the election year. This pattern
was driven by higher social expenditure.
Another important nding is linked to the timing and size of the
political budget cycles in the two periods (before and after 1936). In
the rst period, the expenditure cycle existed only in pre-electoral
years (one year and two years before elections) while in the second
period, this cycle only existed during election years. The magnitude
of the coe¢cients also indicate that the cycle was stronger in the rst
period than in the second one. This could be explained, in part, by
the greater exibility that the government had to control and manip-
ulate the budget and to the existence of fewer government monitoring
agencies.
We nd the existence of a weaker revenue cycle. Total revenues
increased before 1936 in pre-electoral periods, due to an increase in
indirect taxes, but this trend disappears after 1936. Hence, the higher
expenditure in electoral year in the second period must have been
nanced with debt. It is not clear if this is due to the change in voters
characteristics or to a greater access to credit markets.
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(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
1.360e+06* 1.637e+06** 2.392e+06** 2.453e+06** ­1372000* ­1.367e+06** 619,072 614,679
(0.079) (0.049) (0.036) (0.040) (0.036) (0.039) (0.392) (0.394)
­1.007e+07 ­1.005e+07 ­9.842e+06 ­9.800e+06 1.64e+07* 1.70e+07* ­7.389e+06 ­7.659e+06
(0.177) (0.196) (0.163) (0.181) (0.083) (0.079) (0.339) (0.333)
­0.215** ­0.215** ­0.282*** ­0.275** 0.183* 0.195* ­0.0872 ­0.0891
(0.0288) (0.0271) (0.008) (0.012) (0.0957) (0.0776) (0.437) (0.427)
Controls Included No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Table I
a) Dependent Variable: Total Expenditure in real terms ­ β4 coefficient ­ Equation 1.
One and Two years before
elections
One year before elections Election year One year after election
b) Dependent Variable: Total Expenditure in log ­ α4 coefficient ­ Equation 2.
Total Expenditure
1830­2000
1830­1936
1937­2000
Notes : The table reports  OLS estimates  and p­ va lues  of equation 1 and 2.  Each cel l  i s  a  di fferent regress ion. Column (1) indicates  the period that i s  included
in the estima tion. In a) i s  reported β4 coeffi cient and the dependent variable i s  Tota l  expenditure in rea l  terms . In b) i s  reported α4 coeffi cient and the
dependent variable i s  Tota l  Expenditure in log. Columns  (2) to (9) indicates  the timing of the variable "election_{t+i }" where i
?
{­2,­1,0,1}.Columns  (2) and (3)
reports  the results  when i=­2, columns  (4) and (5) when i=­1, columns  (6) and (7) when i=0 and columns  (8) and (9) when i=1. For each combination of the
dependent variable and the election variable we run two type of regress ions : wi thout and wi th controls . The estima tion wi thout controls  only includes  the
"trend" and the "cycl i ca l  component". The estimation with controls  a lso include the variable  " hegemony" that takes  the va lue 1 i f the conservative party wa s
in power in year t and 0 i f i t was  the l ibera l  or a  dictator; the variable "war" takes  the va lue 1 i f in year t there wa s  a  civi l  wa r and 0 otherwise; the variable
"consti tution" takes  the va lue 1 in the years  where a  new consti tution was  establ ished and 0 otherwise, the variable "coup" takes  the va lue 1 in the years
where there was  a  coup and 0 otherwi se, the dummy "d_1910" takes  the va lue 1 in 1910 and 0 otherwise and measures  the change from i ndi rect to di rect voting
system a nd the variable "d_1957" takes  the va lue 1 in 1957 and 0 otherwise and measure the year that wa s  establ i shed the women's  suffrage. P­va lues  are
reported for the respective tests . *** Denotes  s ignficance at 1% l evel . ** Denotes  s ignficance at 5% l evel . * Denotes  s ignficance at 10% level .
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(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
786,339*** 1.081e+06*** 849,408*** 925,953*** ­652,603** ­591,678** 44,191 119,712
(0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.004) (0.025) (0.027) (0.851) (0.630)
2.044e+06 1.664e+06 2.643e+06 2.381e+06 ­2.192e+06 ­2.275e+06 ­1.151e+06 ­47,016
(0.192) (0.275) (0.124) (0.160) (0.270) (0.254) (0.612) (0.982)
0.0476*** 0.0536** 0.0399* 0.0384* ­0.0255 ­0.0256 0.00326 0.00501
(0.007) (0.018) (0.054) (0.092) (0.236) (0.210) (0.844) (0.780)
0.0207 0.0207 ­0.00274 ­0.00180 ­0.0171 ­0.0166 ­0.00467 ­0.00209
(0.103) (0.110) (0.809) (0.865) (0.137) (0.183) (0.745) (0.887)
­0.584*** ­0.568*** ­0.697*** ­0.680*** 0.313 0.369 ­0.00282 0.0600
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.101) (0.159) (0.988) (0.754)
­0.0555*** ­0.0578*** ­0.0523** ­0.0516** 0.0175 0.0195 0.0203 0.0245
(0.00502) (0.00914) (0.0184) (0.0271) (0.466) (0.399) (0.291) (0.216)
68,477 57,865 93,877 79,355  ­86877 ­90439.56 53,058 24,812
(0.241) (0.300) (0.148) (0.262) (0.100) (0.136) (0.133) (0.530)
­4.991e+06* ­5.786e+06* ­203,050 ­807,854 9.527e+06** 8.473e+06** ­859,472 526,477
(0.080) (0.051) (0.933) (0.738) (0.0180) (0.0265) (0.794) (0.861)
0.00318 0.000520 ­0.00473 ­0.00698 ­0.00432 ­0.00455 0.00287 0.00231
(0.521) (0.925) (0.322) (0.155) (0.369) (0.389) (0.589) (0.674)
0.000238 ­0.00235 0.00583 0.00419 0.0256 0.0231 ­0.00682 ­0.00284
(0.980) (0.817) (0.489) (0.636) (0.182) (0.241) (0.532) (0.790)
 ­0.382***  ­0.298** ­0.262 ­0.255 0.436*** 0.414*** ­0.217 ­0.176
(0.005) (0.037) (0.130) (0.154) (0.002) (0.003) (0.114) (0.167)
­0.00748 ­0.00403 0.0123 0.0152  0.03182*  0.02998* ­0.0171 ­0.0145
(0.674) (0.827) (0.547) (0.465) (0.052)  (0.068) (0.363) (0.439)
Controls Included No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Table II
A) Infrastructure Expenditure
b) Dependent Variable: Infrastructure Expenditure in percentage ­ β4 coefficient ­ Equation 1.
1830­1936
1937­2000
One and Two years before
elections
One year before elections Election year One year after election
a) Dependent Variable: Infrastructure Expenditure in real terms ­ β4 coefficient  ­ Equation 1.
1830­1936
1937­2000
Notes: The table reports OLS estimates and p­ values of equation 1 and 2.  Each cell  is a different regression. Column (1) indicates the period that is included
in the estimation. The table presents two panels. Panel A) shows results when dependent variable is Infrastructure expenditure and panel B) when is Social
Expenditure. In each panel: a) reports β4 coefficient when the dependent variable is in real terms. b) reports β4 coefficient when the dependent variable is  in
percentage. In c) reports  α4 when the dependent variable is in log. in d) reports α4 when the dependent variable is in percentage. Columns (2) to (9) indicates
the timing of the variable "election_{t+i}" where i
?
{­2,­1,0,1}.Columns (2) and (3) reports the results when i=­2, columns (4) and (5) when i=­1, columns (6) and
(7) when i=0 and columns (8) and (9) when i=1. For each combination of the dependent variable and the election variable we run two type of regressions:
without and with controls. The estimation without controls only includes the "trend" and the "cyclical component". The estimation with controls also include
the variable " hegemony" that takes the value 1 if the conservative party was in power in year t and 0 if it was the liberal or a dictator; the variable "war"
takes the value 1 if in year t there was a civi l  war and 0 otherwise; the variable "constitution" takes the value 1 in the years where a new constitution was
establ ished and 0 otherwise, the variable "coup" takes the value 1 in the years where there was a coup and 0 otherwise, the dummy "d_1910" takes the value
1 in 1910 and 0 otherwise and measures the change from indirect to direct voting system and the variable "d_1957" takes the value 1 in 1957 and 0 otherwise
and measure the year that was establ ished the women's suffrage. P­values are reported for the respective tests. *** Denotes signficance at 1% level. **
Denotes signficance at 5% level. * Denotes signficance at 10% level.
1830­2000
1830­2000
b) Dependent Variable: Social  Expenditure in percentage ­ β4 coefficient ­ Equation 1.
1830­1936
1937­2000
c) Dependent Variable: Social Expenditure in log ­ α4 coefficient ­ Equation 2.
d) Dependent Variable: Social  Expenditure in percentage­ α4 coefficient ­ Equation 2.
d) Dependent Variable: Infrastructure Expenditure in percentage­ α4 coefficient ­ Equation 2.
B) Social Expenditure
a) Dependent Variable: Social Expenditure in real terms ­ β4 coefficient ­ Equation 1.
1830­1936
1937­2000
c) Dependent Variable: Infrastructure Expenditure in log ­ α4 coefficient ­ Equation 2.
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(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
42,700 83,771 6,928 12,386 ­54,310 ­47,484 ­91,434 ­90,769
(0.730) (0.482) (0.949) (0.910) (0.738) (0.790) (0.527) (0.557)
­2.614e+06 ­508,160 ­1.039e+07 ­9.143e+06 93,841 951,089 1929327 ­1.621e+06
(0.568) (0.896) (0.152) (0.202) (0.974) (0.736) (0.765) (0.754)
­0.00983 ­0.00822 ­0.0254 ­0.0239 0.00302 0.000647 ­0.0165 ­0.0143
(0.509) (0.599) (0.142) (0.177) (0.857) (0.972) (0.297) (0.359)
­0.0238 ­0.0210 ­0.0258 ­0.0242 ­0.0157 ­0.0139 0.0137 0.00632
(0.156) (0.223) (0.239) (0.283) (0.137) (0.188) (0.478) (0.742)
­0.0635 ­0.0711 ­0.0815 ­0.0745 0.0615 0.0918 ­0.0150 ­0.0263
(0.662) (0.622) (0.582) (0.614) (0.677) (0.547) (0.935) (0.887)
0.0204 0.0177 0.0233 0.0220 ­0.00918 ­0.00617 0.0186 0.0148
(0.304) (0.389) (0.258) (0.289) (0.653) (0.772) (0.422) (0.507)
62,442 92,133 327,645 337,281 ­347,450** ­288,100* ­65,174 ­54,561
(0.780) (0.714) (0.408) (0.412) (0.042) (0.068) (0.606) (0.670)
­3.127e+06 ­3.130e+06 ­1.963e+06 ­1.991e+06 1.054e+07 1.076e+07 ­3.082e+06 ­3.084e+06
(0.505) (0.532) (0.593) (0.602) (0.235) (0.242) (0.400) (0.431)
­0.0105 ­0.00818 ­0.000660 ­0.000166 ­0.0224 ­0.0160 ­0.00165 0.00106
(0.442) (0.542) (0.962) (0.990) (0.134) (0.261) (0.900) (0.933)
­2.84e­05 ­0.000925 0.00235 0.00164 0.0168 0.0162 ­0.00327 ­0.00504
(0.998) (0.929) (0.778) (0.850) (0.294) (0.331) (0.693) (0.564)
­0.117 ­0.123 ­0.257** ­0.257** 0.444*** 0.456*** ­0.184 ­0.191
(0.345) (0.303) (0.032) (0.031) (0.0041) (0.0039) (0.124) (0.114)
0.00435 0.000884 ­0.00493 ­0.00780 0.0490** 0.0417* ­0.0131 ­0.0136
(0.800) (0.958) (0.765) (0.636) (0.0383) (0.0864) (0.459) (0.447)
68,477 57,865 93,877 79,355  ­86877 ­90439.56 53,058 24,812
(0.241) (0.300) (0.148) (0.262) (0.100) (0.136) (0.133) (0.530)
­464,221 ­540,081 ­1.011e+06 ­1.107e+06 ­1.595e+06 ­1.590e+06 1.864e+06 2.485e+06*
(0.704) (0.671) (0.546) (0.520) (0.134) (0.164) (0.140) (0.0610)
­0.0270 ­0.0126 0.0249 0.0355 ­0.0109 ­0.0113 0.0186 0.0295
(0.291) (0.614) (0.410) (0.223) (0.678) (0.672) (0.524) (0.265)
­0.000352 0.00221 ­0.00967 ­0.00799 ­0.0191** ­0.0187** 0.0186** 0.0214**
(0.972) (0.826) (0.351) (0.461) (0.012) (0.014) (0.049) (0.017)
­0.113 ­0.126 ­0.391** ­0.393** 0.0676 0.0943 ­0.000775 ­0.0384
(0.481) (0.410) (0.0335) (0.0258) (0.656) (0.533) (0.997) (0.830)
0.0294 0.0245 ­0.0269 ­0.0317 ­0.0123 ­0.00891 ­0.00458 ­0.0133
(0.262) (0.341) (0.358) (0.244) (0.636) (0.732) (0.882) (0.631)
Table III
A) Dependent Variable: Finance Expenditure
One and Two years before
elections
One year before elections Election year One year after election
1830­1936
a) Dependent Variable in real terms ­ β4 coefficient ­ Equation 1.
1830­1936
1937­2000
b) Dependent Variable as percentage ­ β4 coefficient ­ Equation 1.
1830­1936
1937­2000
1830­2000
c) Dependent Variable in log ­ α4 coefficient ­ Equation 2.
d) Dependent Variable as percentage­ α4 coefficient ­ Equation 2.
B)Dependent Variable: Institutional Expenditure
a) Dependent Variable in real terms ­ β4 coefficient ­ Equation 1.
1937­2000
b) Dependent Variable as percentage ­ β4 coefficient ­ Equation 1.
1830­1936
1937­2000
1830­2000
c) Dependent Variable in log ­ α4 coefficient ­ Equation 2.
d) Dependent Variable as percentage­ α4 coefficient ­ Equation 2.
C) Dependent Variable: Defence Expenditure
a) Dependent Variable in real terms ­ β4 coefficient ­ Equation 1.
1830­1936
1937­2000
b) Dependent Variable as percentage ­ β4 coefficient ­ Equation 1.
1830­1936
1937­2000
1830­2000
c) Dependent Variable in log ­ α4 coefficient ­ Equation 2.
d) Dependent Variable as percentage­ α4 coefficient ­ Equation 2.
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147,296 123,245 105,878 83,549 185,081 127,748 ­14,657 ­72,184
(0.337) (0.363) (0.454) (0.550) (0.340) (0.462) (0.926) (0.640)
1.031e+06 1.042e+06 71,254 56,988 ­881,411 ­881,593 ­2.799e+06 ­2.958e+06
(0.597) (0.609) (0.970) (0.977) (0.639) (0.651) (0.147) (0.139)
0.00345 ­0.00410 ­0.0253 ­0.0301* 0.0405 0.0362 ­0.0187 ­0.0274
(0.862) (0.832) (0.152) (0.099) (0.105) (0.111) (0.354) (0.189)
0.00179 0.00134 0.00557 0.00537 ­0.00867 ­0.00966 ­0.00989 ­0.0113
(0.873) (0.910) (0.637) (0.656) (0.495) (0.465) (0.317) (0.292)
­0.133 ­0.118 0.0261 0.0492 ­0.190 ­0.167 0.0253 0.0431
(0.456) (0.500) (0.880) (0.783) (0.334) (0.382) (0.879) (0.794)
­0.00180 0.00162 0.0377* 0.0408* ­0.0521* ­0.0495* 0.00894 0.0143
(0.940) (0.944) (0.0828) (0.0689) (0.0611) (0.0624) (0.682) (0.528)
1830­1936
 902455
(0.231)
1298273
(0.105)
 1684460**
(0.044)
1802758**
(0.034)
 ­929364
(0.247)
 ­851650
(0.321)
 550605
(0.508)
 712609
(0.410)
1937­2000
1.15e+07
(0.475)
1.24e+07
(0.456)
 5515193
(0.769)
 6329632
(0.744)
2.15e+07
(0.251)
2.20e+07
(0.254)
 ­3.79e+07**
(0.041)
 ­4.24e+07**
(0.029)
Controls Included No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
a) Dependent Variable in real terms ­ β4 coefficient ­ Equation 1.
E) Dependent Variable:  Deficit
a) Dependent Variable in real terms ­ β4 coefficient ­ Equation 1.
1830­1936
1937­2000
b) Dependent Variable in percentage ­ β4 coefficient ­ Equation 1.
1830­1936
1937­2000
1830­2000
c) Dependent Variable in log ­ α4 coefficient ­ Equation 2.
d) Dependent Variable in percentage­ α4 coefficient ­ Equation 2.
D) Dependent Variable:  Debt Expenditure
Notes: The table reports OLS estimates and p­ values of equation 1 and 2.  Each cell  is a different regression. Column (1) indicates the period that is
included in the estimation. The table presents five panels. Panel A) shows results when dependent variable is Finance Expenditure, panel B) when is
Institutional Expenditure, panel C) when is Defense Expenditure, panel D) when is Debt Expenditure, panel E) when is Deficit. In each panel: a) reports
β4 coefficient when the dependent variable is in real terms. b) reports β4 coefficient when the dependent variable is  in percentage. In c) reports  α4
when the dependent variable is in log and in d) reports α4 when the dependent variable is in percentage. Columns (2) to (9) indicates the timing of the
variable "election_{t+i}" where i
?
{­2,­1,0,1}.Columns (2) and (3) reports the results when i=­2, columns (4) and (5) when i=­1, columns (6) and (7) when
i=0 and columns (8) and (9) when i=1. For each combination of the dependent variable and the election variable we run two type of regressions:
without and with controls. The estimation without controls only includes the "trend" and the "cyclical component". The estimation with controls also
include the variable "hegemony" that takes the value 1 if the conservative party was in power in year t and 0 if it was the l iberal or a dictator; the
variable "war" takes the value 1 if in year t there was a civi l  war and 0 otherwise; the variable "constitution" takes the value 1 in the years where a
new constitution was established and 0 otherwise, the variable "coup" takes the value 1 in the years where there was a coup and 0 otherwise, the
dummy "d_1910" takes the value 1 in 1910 and 0 otherwise and measures the change from indirect to direct voting system and the variable "d_1957"
takes the value 1 in 1957 and 0 otherwise and measure the year that was established the women's suffrage. P­values are reported for the respective
tests. *** Denotes signficance at 1% level. ** Denotes signficance at 5% level. * Denotes signficance at 10% level.
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(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
1830­1936
406928
(0.139)
449910
(0.102)
697983*
(0.051)
727912**
(0.040)
 ­238855
(0.473)
 ­242599
(0.453)
 ­123216
(0.693)
 ­127846
(0.702)
1937­2000
 ­ 1985e+07
(0.286)
 ­2061e+07
(0.304)
 ­1016e+07
(0.457)
 ­1119e+07
(0.447)
3112e+06
(0.840)
4779e+06
(0.763)
2249e+07
(0.536)
2373e+07
(0.560)
­0.174** ­0.164** ­0.171** ­0.169** 0.105 0.128* 0.0161 0.0301
(0.0175) (0.0228) (0.0468) (0.0474) (0.175) (0.0881) (0.857) (0.742)
Controls Included No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Notes : The table reports  OLS estima tes  and p­ va lues  of equation 1 and 2.  Each cel l  i s  a  di fferent regress ion. Column (1) i ndicates  the
period that i s  included in the estimation. In a) i s  reported β4 coeffi cient and the dependent variable i s  Tota l  Revenues  in rea l  terms. In b)
i s  reported α4 coefficient and the dependent variable i s  Tota l  Revenues  in log. Columns  (2) to (9) indicates  the timing of the variable
"election_{t+i }" where i
?
{­2,­1,0,1}.Columns  (2) and (3) reports  the resul ts  when i=­2, columns  (4) and (5) when i=­1, columns  (6) and (7) when
i=0 and columns  (8) and (9) when i=1. For each combination of the dependent variable and the election variable we run two type of
regress ions : without and with controls . The estimation without controls  only includes  the "trend" and the "cycl ica l  component". The
estimation with controls  a l so include the variable  " hegemony" that takes  the va lue 1 i f the conservative party wa s  in power in year t and 0
i f i t was  the l ibera l  or a  dictator; the variable "war" takes  the va lue 1 i f in year t there was  a  civi l  war and 0 otherwise; the variable
"consti tution" takes  the va lue 1 in the years  where a  new consti tution was  establ i shed and 0 otherwise, the variable "coup" takes  the
value 1 in the years  where there wa s  a  coup and 0 otherwi se, the dummy "d_1910" takes  the va lue 1 in 1910 and 0 otherwi se and measures
the change from i ndirect to di rect voting s ystem a nd the variable "d_1957" takes  the va lue 1 in 1957 and 0 otherwi se and measure the year
that was  establ i shed the women's  suffrage. P­va lues  are reported for the respective tests . *** Denotes  s ignficance at 1% level . ** Denotes
s ignficance at 5% level . * Denotes  s ignficance at 10% level .
a) Dependent Variable: Total Revenues in real terms ­ β4 coefficient ­ Equation 1.
b) Dependent Variable: Total Revenues in log ­ α4 coefficient ­ Equation 2.
1830­2000
Table IV
Total Revenues
One and Two years
before elections
One year before
elections
Election year One year after election
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(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
1830­1936
29165
(0.391)
16697
(0.634)
 ­832.9
(0.967)
 ­10065
(0.664)
 ­23805
(0.417)
 ­29077
(0.377)
 ­10207
(0.756)
 ­25365
(0.454)
1937­2000
 ­3247e+06
(0.289)
 ­1594e+06
(0.532)
 ­4453e+06
(0.126)
 ­3427e+06
(0.202)
905584
(0.721)
2087e+06
(0.362)
2275e+06
(0.651)
 ­1694e+06
(0.610)
1830­1936
 ­0.00301
(0.634)
 ­ 0.00507
(0.440)
 ­0.003
(0.467)
 ­ 0.0051
(0.321)
0.005
(0.454)
0.006
(0.432)
 ­0.004
(0.422)
 ­0.007
(0.268)
0.0202 0.0231 0.00387 0.00548 ­0.0254** ­0.0244* 0.00257 ­0.00837
(0.183) (0.130) (0.812) (0.738) (0.0408) (0.0513) (0.907) (0.699)
­0.327* ­0.380** ­0.286* ­0.292 0.272 0.285 0.0337 0.0608
(0.0878) (0.0393) (0.0930) (0.133) (0.442) (0.417) (0.863) (0.759)
0.0266 0.0240 0.00482 0.00397 ­0.0291** ­0.0300** 0.00796 0.00490
(0.111) (0.154) (0.780) (0.822) (0.0496) (0.0454) (0.727) (0.831)
1830­1936
380343**
(0.017)
400812**
(0.010)
573000***
(0.000)
583665***
(0.000)
 ­230931
(0.250)
 ­236192
(0.241)
31238
(0.857)
19279
(0.920)
1937­2000
2258e+06
(0.505)
1005e+06
(0.771)
7267e+06
(0.112)
6310e+06
(0.149)
 ­3118e+06
(0.467)
 ­2685e+06
(0.518)
 ­3531e+06
(0.328)
 ­1993e+06
(0.573)
1830­1936
0.0144
(0.500)
0.00703
(0.745)
0.0109
(0.663)
0.00474
(0.857)
 ­0.0174
(0.504)
 ­0.0152
(0.558)
0.020
(0.369)
0.022
(0.320)
0.0285 0.0273 0.0363** 0.0358* ­0.0142 ­0.0152 ­0.0170 ­0.0131
(0.114) (0.156) (0.0401) (0.0528) (0.458) (0.449) (0.447) (0.590)
­0.102 ­0.0942 ­0.108 ­0.105 0.0486 0.0667 ­0.0718 ­0.0557
(0.156) (0.182) (0.189) (0.195) (0.609) (0.489) (0.385) (0.515)
0.0146 0.0179 0.0206 0.0243 0.000967 ­0.00253 ­0.0417 ­0.0375
(0.605) (0.522) (0.507) (0.436) (0.975) (0.937) (0.175) (0.245)
1830­1936
19425
(0.681)
2572
(0.963)
105388*
(0.057)
106255*
(0.060)
31973
(0.606)
29836
(0.640)
39630
(0.525)
34864
(0.581)
1937­2000
 ­1791e+06**
(0.047)
 ­1621e+06
* (0.090)
 ­160890
(0.820)
 ­207111
(0.770)
593046
(0.599)
737082
(0.512)
1262e+06
(0.307)
990449
(0.464)
1830­1936
0.000
(0.908)
0.000
(0.994)
0.0147
(0.134)
0.0160*
(0.098)
0.001
(0.812)
0.000
(0.991)
0.000
(0.944)
0.002
(0.800)
­0.0261** ­0.0254** 0.000424 0.00114 0.0101 0.0108 0.0135 0.0137
(0.010) (0.013) (0.973) (0.929) (0.221) (0.214) (0.190) (0.209)
­0.459** ­0.400** ­0.203 ­0.191 0.154 0.207 0.0534 0.110
(0.0101) (0.0270) (0.312) (0.313) (0.396) (0.255) (0.793) (0.571)
­0.0264* ­0.0256* ­0.00758 ­0.00809 0.00613 0.00721 0.0115 0.0109
(0.0558) (0.0684) (0.641) (0.612) (0.595) (0.553) (0.415) (0.433)
1830­1936
24735
(0.784)
2501
(0.971)
 ­19363
(0.851)
 ­14991
(0.884)
213768
(0.144)
151894
(0.239)
 ­77263
(0.459)
 ­95992
(0.398)
a) Dependent Variable in real terms ­ β4 coefficient ­ Equation 1.
b) Dependent Variable in percentage ­ β4 coefficient ­ Equation 1.
Table V
One and Two years
before elections
One year before
elections
Election year One year after election
A) Dependent Variable: Direct Taxes
1830­2000
c) Dependent Variable in log ­ α4 coefficient ­ Equation 2.
d) Dependent Variable in percentage­ α4 coefficient ­ Equation 2.
B)Dependent Variable: Indirect Taxes
a) Dependent Variable in real terms ­ β4 coefficient ­ Equation 1.
C) Dependent Variable: Fees and Fines
a) Dependent Variable in real terms ­ β4 coefficient ­ Equation 1.
b) Dependent Variable in percentage ­ β4 coefficient ­ Equation 1.
b) Dependent Variable in percentage ­ β4 coefficient ­ Equation 1.
1937­2000
1830­2000
c) Dependent Variable in log ­ α4 coefficient ­ Equation 2.
d) Dependent Variable in percentage­ α4 coefficient ­ Equation 2.
1830­2000
c) Dependent Variable in log ­ α4 coefficient ­ Equation 2.
d) Dependent Variable in percentage­ α4 coefficient ­ Equation 2.
D) Dependent Variable:  National Properties
a) Dependent Variable in real terms ­ β4 coefficient ­ Equation 1.
1937­2000
1937­2000
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1830­1936
24735
(0.784)
2501
(0.971)
 ­19363
(0.851)
 ­14991
(0.884)
213768
(0.144)
151894
(0.239)
 ­77263
(0.459)
 ­95992
(0.398)
1937­2000
 ­1796e+06*
(0.064)
 ­1863e+06*
(0.071)
 ­455630
(0.660)
 ­455453
(0.678)
708826
(0.642)
644188
(0.683)
1770e+06
(0.284)
1914e+06
(0.268)
1830­1936
 ­ 0.0311**
(0.018)
 ­0.0231**
(0.021)
 ­0.0341**
(0.032)
 ­ 0.0277*
(0.055)
0.045**
(0.011)
0.046***
(0.002)
  ­0.0296**
(0.028)
 ­0.029*
(0.081)
0.00096 0.00093 0.00644 0.00662 0.00165 0.000967 ­0.00135 ­0.00047
(0.787) (0.807) (0.117) (0.110) (0.702) (0.832) (0.745) (0.912)
­0.134 ­0.125 0.100 0.0987 ­0.363 ­0.326 0.411 0.423
(0.515) (0.528) (0.636) (0.640) (0.188) (0.244) (0.140) (0.155)
0.0336** 0.0296** 0.0463*** 0.0425*** ­0.0474** ­0.0472*** 0.0320** 0.0258*
(0.0131) (0.0134) (0.00410) (0.00434) (0.0116) (0.00317) (0.017) (0.089)
1830­1936
48624
(0.501)
66534
(0.460)
95392
(0.421)
104242
(0.413)
 ­137391**
(0.042)
 ­124265**
(0.037)
 ­86112
(0.174)
  ­75495
(0.153)
1937­2000  ­2281e+06**
(0.043)
 ­
2339e+06**
(0.046)
 ­1559e+06*
(0.086)
 ­1658e+06*
(0.077)
 ­712433
(0.557)
 ­568370
(0.645)
3860e+06**
* (0.009)
4014e+06**
(0.011)
1830­1936
0.008
(0.524)
0.009
(0.547)
0.0147
(0.493)
0.0157
(0.490)
 ­0.0217
(0.110)
 ­0.022
(0.103)
 ­0.016
(0.121)
  ­0.015*
(0.099)
­0.00426 ­0.00432 ­0.0118* ­0.0120* ­0.00306 ­0.00226 0.0111 0.0119
(0.520) (0.534) (0.051) (0.056) (0.649) (0.739) (0.155) (0.160)
­0.332 ­0.294 ­0.663 ­0.631 0.497 0.507 0.626 0.727
(0.497) (0.562) (0.275) (0.308) (0.347) (0.334) (0.223) (0.163)
­0.0116 ­0.0115 ­0.0247 ­0.0252 0.0214 0.0224 0.0277** 0.0289**
(0.439) (0.457) (0.262) (0.270) (0.139) (0.120) (0.029) (0.024)
Controls Included No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
b) Dependent Variable in percentage ­ β4 coefficient ­ Equation 1.
1830­2000
c) Dependent Variable in log ­ α4 coefficient ­ Equation 2.
d) Dependent Variable in percentage­ α4 coefficient ­ Equation 2.
D) Dependent Variable:  National Properties
a) Dependent Variable in real terms ­ β4 coefficient ­ Equation 1.
E) Dependent Variable:  Treasury Balance Resources
a) Dependent Variable in real terms ­ β4 coefficient ­ Equation 1.
Notes: The table reports OLS estimates and p­ values for equation 1 and 2.  Each cell  is a different regression. Column (1) indicates the period
that is included in the estimation. The table presents five panels. Panel A) shows results when dependent variable is Direct Taxes, panel B)
when is Indirect Taxes, panel C) when is Fees and Fines, panel D) when is National Properties, panel E) when is Treasury Balance Resources. In
each panel: a) reports β4 coefficient when the dependent variable is in real terms. b) reports β4 coefficient when the dependent variable is  in
percentage. In c) reports  α5 when the dependent variable is in log and in d) reports α5 when the dependent variable is in percentage. Columns
(2) to (9) indicates the timing of the variable "election_{t+i}" where i
?
{­2,­1,0,1}.Columns (2) and (3) reports the results when i=­2, columns (4)
and (5) when i=­1, columns (6) and (7) when i=0 and columns (8) and (9) when i=1. For each combination of the dependent variable and the
election variable we run two type of regressions: without and with controls. The estimation without controls only includes the "trend" and the
"cyclical component". The estimation with controls also include the variable "hegemony" that takes the value 1 if the conservative party was in
power in year t and 0 if it was the liberal or a dictator; the variable "war" takes the value 1 if in year t there was a civil  war and 0 otherwise; the
variable "constitution" takes the value 1 in the years where a new constitution was established and 0 otherwise, the variable "coup" takes the
value 1 in the years where there was a coup and 0 otherwise, the dummy "d_1910" takes the value 1 in 1910 and 0 otherwise and measures the
change from indirect to direct voting system and the variable "d_1957" takes the value 1 in 1957 and 0 otherwise and measure the year that
was established the women's suffrage. P­values are reported for the respective tests. *** Denotes signficance at 1% level. ** Denotes
signficance at 5% level. * Denotes signficance at 10% level.
b) Dependent Variable in percentage ­ β4 coefficient ­ Equation 1.
1830­2000
c) Dependent Variable in log ­ α4 coefficient ­ Equation 2.
d) Dependent Variable in percentage­ α4 coefficient ­ Equation 2.
1937­2000
1937­2000
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Country Year
Roads, Total
Networks (Km per
capita) Year
Rail Lines (Total
Route­Km)
Colombia 2009 0.284 2009 1,672
Argentina 2003 0.609 2010 25,023
Bolivia 2009 0.822 2009 2,866
Chile 2009 0.474 2010 5,352
Brazil 2004 0.096 2010 29,817
Costa Rica 2009 0.850
Ecuador 2007 0.315
Jamaica 2009 0.821
Mexico 2009 0.327 2010 26,704
Nicaragua 2009 0.385
Paraguay 2008 0.506
Peru 2009 0.440 2010 2,020
Puerto Rico 2008 0.709
Uruguay 2004 2.354 2008 2,993
Venezuela 2008 336
Source: World Bank
Table VI
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1827 150
…
1835 119
…
1837 152
1838 160
…
1843 139
1844 138
1845 134
…
1847 137
1848 137
…
1850 131
1851 125
…
1874 269
…
1882 221
…
1887 215
…
1890 206
1891 220
…
1893 217
1894 211
…
1896 226
…
1898 256
…
1903 259
…
1905 480
Source: Ramirez and Salazar (2007)
Table VII
Students enroll in primary
school / Population
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Public
Schools
Private
Schools
1837 21,168 4,903
1838 22,343 6,015
1843 18,359 7,933
1844 19,361 7,763
1845 19,418 7,401
1848 21,511 7,631
1850 21,678 7,143
…
1916 329,573 18,412
…
1950 758,156 50,338
Source: Ramirez and Salazar (2007)
Number of Students enroll in
primary school
Table VIII
57
Without
Controls
With
Controls
Without
Controls
With
Controls
Without
Controls
With
Controls
­0.194* ­0.195** ­0.258** ­0.252** 0.169 0.178
(0.0523) (0.0466) (0.0171) (0.0232) (0.138) (0.126)
­0.422*** ­0.404*** ­0.307** ­0.283* 0.367** 0.381**
(0.001) (0.003) (0.047) (0.069) (0.0121) (0.0127)
­0.0128 ­0.00958 0.00775 0.0107 0.0314* 0.0280*
(0.448) (0.584) (0.691) (0.587) (0.0553) (0.0889)
­0.542*** ­0.519*** ­0.680*** ­0.659*** 0.211 0.270
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.310) (0.208)
­0.0524*** ­0.0510** ­0.0505** ­0.0493** ­0.00431 ­0.00255
(0.00874) (0.0194) (0.0261) (0.0387) (0.857) (0.913)
Without
Controls
With
Controls
Without
Controls
With
Controls
Without
Controls
With
Controls
­0.227** ­0.226** ­0.291*** ­0.284*** 0.181 0.195*
(0.020) (0.0195) (0.00704) (0.00941) (0.101) (0.0796)
­0.387*** ­0.363*** ­0.284* ­0.260 0.415*** 0.427***
(0.005) (0.009) (0.0744) (0.104) (0.0033) (0.0029)
­0.00921 ­0.00582 0.0110 0.0139 0.0352** 0.0323*
(0.614) (0.756) (0.592) (0.507) (0.0329) (0.0512)
­0.570*** ­0.554*** ­0.689*** ­0.673*** 0.319* 0.365*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.0922) (0.0598)
­0.0514*** ­0.0527** ­0.0500** ­0.0491** 0.0188 0.0199
(0.00879) (0.0143) (0.0231) (0.0325) (0.435) (0.394)
Social Expenditure (in log)
Social Expenditure (%)
Infrastructure Expenditure (in log)
Infrastructure Expenditure (%)
P­values are reported for the respective tests. *** Denotes signficance at 1% level. ** Denotes
signficance at 5% level. * Denotes signficance at 10% level.
Total expenditure (in log)
Table IX
One and two years
before elections
One year before
elections Election years
1932
1940
One and two years
before elections
One year before
elections Election years
Total expenditure (in log)
Social Expenditure (in log)
Social Expenditure (%)
Infrastructure Expenditure (in log)
Infrastructure Expenditure (%)
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